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COMMENT: LIBERTY, PROSPERITY, AND
A STRONG JUDICIAL INSTITUTION
STEPHEN G. BREYER*
I
The members of our Court at times have the experience of talking to judges
and lawyers from other countries, particularly from Latin America and Eastern
Europe. What we discover, across the board, I can only describe as the movement, almost worldwide, toward a realization that people’s liberty and their
prosperity depend in part upon strong judicial institutions.
Recently, I heard Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, discuss the link between prosperity and a vibrant judiciary. He spoke of how
business throughout the world requires courts that work fairly, honestly, and
efficiently. People in all areas of society have begun to realize that strong
courts are necessary for prosperity. By being able to see, through television
and what they read in the newspapers, what happens in other countries, they
have also come to realize that the same is true for personal liberty. So we in
the judiciary understand, and I believe the American people understand, that
what they treasure, their liberty, and also their prosperity, depends upon strong
judicial institutions.
We as lawyers and judges also believe something that is sometimes harder
for a person who is not a lawyer or a judge to understand—that strong judicial
institutions depend upon judicial independence. What we mean by judicial independence is an assurance that the judge will never respond to what used to
happen in some countries: the telephone call from the party boss in the middle
of the night—“telephone justice”—telling the judge how to decide the case.
The assurance of judicial independence has many features. It depends in
part upon a length of service not subject to the will of a political official. There
must be some security that salaries will not be diminished simply because a
judge makes an unpopular decision. Judges must have adequate resources to
do their jobs. Judicial independence also necessitates that judges’ decisions be
totally open to criticism by the press, by legislators, and by the public. There
must be an assurance that the judge is honest; this involves frequent public
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scrutiny of the judge’s financial affairs. It may make us uncomfortable to file
the disclosure forms, but it is necessary.
Judicial independence also means that a judicial institution is functioning
fairly, honestly, and effectively at a cost that people can afford; after all, the
courts are simply a means to an end. We must keep in mind that judicial independence is a means toward a strong judicial institution. The strong judicial institution is a means toward securing the basic goals of people: human liberty
and a reasonable level of prosperity.
Legislative control of the judiciary’s funding is only one difficult aspect of
the issue of judicial independence. Legislators adopt the statutes creating the
judiciary and they appropriate its budget; in addition, of course, the laws enacted by the legislature are continuously interpreted by judges. It is not surprising, then, that legislators sometimes ask, “Why do you judges ask me to
vote the money for your institution but not try to exercise any control over that
institution?” The judges respond, “Because that is what judicial independence
means.” The relationship between legitimate oversight and illegitimate control, however, is a little more complex than that. It is a difficult task to define
the limits that govern the relationship between the legislator and the judge in a
system of government that simultaneously requires democratic accountability
1
and judicial independence.
II
The notion of judicial independence is also a state of mind—on the part of
the judge, the legislator, and the public. What do I mean by that? A Russian
paratroop general was visiting our Court, and the State and Defense Departments were particularly anxious that he have a successful visit: In his previous
capacity, he had been in charge of missiles that once targeted the United States
but which no longer do. I was talking to him and took him around the Court.
He asked what I thought was the most important decision in the last one hun2
dred years. In my opinion, it was Brown v. Board of Education, which dismantled segregation in the South. But I added, with some forethought, not to for3
get a decision called Cooper v. Aaron. In that case, all nine Justices signed an
opinion ordering that black children who wanted to attend a white school in the
city of Little Rock—but were prevented by the governor and the state militia—
“They will go in,” said the nine Justices. Well, the Justices were only nine human beings. Neither nine hundred nor nine thousand judges by themselves
could have successfully seen that the children entered the school. The critical
fact was that the President of the United States sent the paratroopers. My message to the paratroop general was that the paratroopers and the judges must

1. See Ernest A. Finney, Jr., Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (Summer 1998); Peter
M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (Summer 1998).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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cooperate. Why is that? I cannot answer it in terms of words on paper. The
answer includes more than the words in our Constitution. It also includes 200
years of history and a civil war, eighty years of experience with a segregated
South, and other events that led to an expectation of public behavior that led
the President to send those paratroopers. That is what we have inherited.
The principle of Cooper v. Aaron may be a part, maybe only a small part, of
judicial independence. But judicial independence is a matter of expectation,
habit, and belief among not just judges, lawyers, and legislators, but millions of
other citizens. Our institutions rest on what those hundreds of millions of citizens think.
Judicial independence, therefore, is ultimately a question of helping the
public to understand. To understand what? Not simply why the public should
follow unpopular judicial decisions with which I agree, but also why the public
should follow unpopular decisions with which I disagree. I must be able to explain to the public why we all should support judicial independence in the face
of decisions that both you and I believe are wrong. What is the explanation?
The answer has to be put in terms of liberty and prosperity, and it has to be
consistent with a democratic society.
I think that judges themselves find it difficult to produce an explanation
that in fact convinces the public. Why is that? It is not because judicial independence is unimportant—it is very important. Rather, it is because as soon as
I start talking about the need for tenure, security for salaries, and adequate resources, the average person will say, “Of course you think that, you have a personal interest, you are a judge, those are your problems. Every person has
problems, and many have worse problems than you.” If the need for judicial
independence is to be explained convincingly—given that we who have the obvious institutional self-interest have trouble delivering the message—I think it
is up to others to do much of the explaining. If the Bar, without the same selfinterest, understands that need and explains it, then I think the message might
get across.

